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■ Abstract Daubert stands for a trilogy of Supreme Court cases as well as revi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Together they represent American law’s most
recent effort to filter expert evidence offered at trial. This review begins by placing the
Daubert trilogy in the context of earlier judicial efforts to solve the screening problem,
which began well before the twentieth century, and then provides a brief explication
of evidence law under Daubert. Next, we discuss several aspects of the jurisprudence
of expert evidence: its connection to debates in the philosophy of science, the practical
legal problems courts are trying to solve, and procedural implications. Then we re-
view and discuss varied impacts of Daubert: changes in law, marked increases in cases
and scholarship relating to expert evidence, and research examining judicial gatekeep-
ing under Daubert (civil defendants appear to benefit greatly and criminal defendants
hardly at all). We conclude by offering several predictions and prescriptions for the
future of expert evidence.
INTRODUCTION
The law of expert testimony provides a lens through which many aspects of modern
legal practice can be studied. Every jurisdiction that confronts devising a rule of
admission for expert evidence must resolve two basic matters. First, how strict
should the rule be? Should it be liberal and allow testimony from virtually all
who claim expertise, stopping short perhaps of astrologers and tea-leaf readers?
Or should it be conservative and demand rigorous proof of experts’ claims of
expertise? The second matter that a jurisdiction must resolve is where the real axis
of decision making will be. Should courts defer to the professionals in the field
from which the experts come, or should they evaluate the quality of the expert
opinion for themselves? Implicit in the answers that a particular jurisdiction gives
to these two, largely independent, matters are numerous beliefs about legal process
and beyond, including its faith in the adversarial process, its confidence in judicial
competence, its trust of the jury system, and even its philosophy and sociology of
science and empirical knowledge.
Yet, the particular admissibility rules that a jurisdiction adopts might not be
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for example, might set forth a restrictive test that obligates courts to evaluate for
themselves the quality of proffered expertise. Such a rule might in theory apply to
all cases yet in practice be applied only to civil matters; in criminal prosecutions,
perhaps, these same courts, ostensibly applying the same rule, might actually
employ a permissive threshold and be highly deferential to the professional field
from which the asserted expertise comes.
The study of expert evidence, therefore, must consider both theory and prac-
tice. The rules on the books might reflect one set of choices about the legal pro-
cess, and in practice a wholly different set might operate. In this review of the
contemporary state of expert evidence, we consider how the law of expert testi-
mony developed into its current incarnation, describe the processes of and justi-
fication for the current state of the law, and examine how it is applied in daily
practice.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
Courts have long struggled to develop a test to guide their gatekeeping of expert
testimony, scientific or otherwise. The task is easily framed: How is a judge to
determine which kinds of opinions from which areas of asserted expertise are
dependable enough to be permitted at trial? But the task presents what may be
an insuperable dilemma: Courts need expert evidence to assist them in making
decisions on issues about which they by definition know far less than the expert,
yet for that very same reason courts are in a poor position to assess the expertise.
The history of rules and procedures for screening expert witnesses represents
successive responses to that dilemma.
Before the Frye Test
Most discussions of the admissibility of scientific expert testimony begin with
Frye v. U.S. (1923). This is an odd custom, first because judges had been screen-
ing expert evidence for centuries before Frye, and second because for decades
after Frye was decided the case was ignored by both courts and scholars
(Faigman et al. 1994). Its influence emerged only when the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence drew near, the very time when Frye should have become
obsolete.
The earliest record of the use in trial of what were then called skilled witnesses
was the 1678 trial of the Earl of Pembroke for the murder of Nathaniel Cony
(Cobbett 1810), although the use of such witnesses was not regarded as a novelty
even in that case. The earliest reported decision affirming the propriety of using
expert witnesses proffered by a party occurred in 1782 in Folkes v. Chadd (Golan
2004). When such experts did testify, courts were not clear or explicit about the
legal principles governing their qualifications or their use. One of the few efforts
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EXPERT EVIDENCE AFTER DAUBERT 107
(beyond the witness’s qualifications) suggests that the courts employed what could
be termed a marketplace test (Faigman et al. 1994). The courts seemed to ask
themselves whether expertise had been of value to consumers in the commercial
marketplace. If consumers spent their money on an expert or an expertise, then it
was presumed to be sound enough for courts as well.
The marketplace test had virtues, but it also had drawbacks (Faigman et al.
2005). The market does not always select for validity. Much that is false, junky,
or harmful may nevertheless sell well. The marketplace test honestly applied is
unable to distinguish between astronomy and astrology and thus would admit both.
In addition, the marketplace test conflates the expert and the expertise. The body
of knowledge and the people who purport to possess it tend to be treated as one. A
final problem, which ultimately gave rise to the Frye test, is that some fields have
little or no life in any commercial marketplace. In particular, there are fields that
have no function outside of their possible courtroom utility. The courtroom is their
marketplace. Where then were judges to look for evaluation help?
Frye and Its Aftermath
The court in Frye was confronted with a technology for which there was at the
time no commercial market—early polygraph examination. To help it evaluate the
admissibility of that testimony, the Frye court devised a variation of the marketplace
test. It substituted an intellectual marketplace for the commercial one. The court
asked whether the principles that underlie the proffered testimony had “gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”
The Frye variant changed the law’s perspective regarding experts in several
substantial ways. Principally, by changing the marketplace from the consumers
of the expertise to the experts themselves, Frye helpfully separated the expertise
from the expert. This innovation divided the issue of admissibility more clearly
into two parts: (a) the credentials of the expert and (b) the body of knowledge the
expert sought to impart. But the Frye innovation also, and counterproductively,
replaced buyers with sellers as the principal evaluators of the value of what was
being offered. Specifically, the test leads the courts to adopt the standards of the
field that is the subject of scrutiny. Thus, rigorous scientific fields are judged using
strict admissibility standards (because that is how they judge themselves), whereas
fields lacking a rigorous tradition are judged using lax admissibility standards
(Evett 1993, Saks & Koehler 1991). Even tea-leaf reading is generally accepted
if the reference field is composed of practicing tea-leaf readers. Although this
transfer of power from consumers to producers may appear peculiar, it was entirely
consistent with one of the defining notions of professionalism extant during much
of the twentieth century (Haber 1991, Pavalko 1988).
The Frye test eventually became a trope for one major notion of the proper
criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence: general acceptance of par-
ticular expertise within its field. The test was seemingly easy to apply, required
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evidence that presented a novel scientific issue, allowing much expert evidence to
be scrutinized minimally, if at all.
Offsetting these advantages were limitations: The Frye test is vague, is easily
manipulated, obscures the relevant inquiry, imposes a protracted waiting period on
the use of sound new evidence and techniques, and lacks any definition of when a
scientific proposition has become generally accepted. Some products of the most
rigorous fields with the healthiest scientific discourse might fail the Frye test, while
the work of shoddy fields with a great deal of uncritical internal acceptance would
easily pass. Moreover, no standards defined what constituted the particular field to
which a technique belonged (to one or many fields, and which ones?). Although
often criticized for being the most conservative test of admissibility, the Frye test
could produce the most liberal standards of admission. The more narrowly a court
defines the pertinent field, the more agreement it is likely to find. The general
acceptance test degenerated into a process of deciding whose noses to count, as
well as how many (Black 1988; Faigman et al. 2005, chapter 1; Giannelli 1980;
Horrobin 1990; Maletskos & Speilman 1967).
Despite Frye’s defects, it remains the standard by which expert evidence is
evaluated by courts in many jurisdictions. Increasingly, however, the alternative
perspective articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (1993), and now the standard codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is gaining ascendance.
The Daubert Trilogy
The Supreme Court’s gatekeeping revolution came in three cases, each of them
essentially unanimous. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) held that
the admissibility of scientific evidence depends mainly on its evidentiary reliability
(its scientific merit)—suggesting that courts consider whether the scientific basis
has been tested empirically, the methodological soundness of that testing, and the
results of that testing. These were flexible criteria, so that if courts thought of
more appropriate criteria they could use the alternatives. Lower courts were later
cautioned, however, against taking flexibility as a license to scrutinize sloppily or
not at all: “Though. . .the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case
the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable and hence an
abuse of discretion” [Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), Scalia concurring].
General Electric v. Joiner (1997) held that appellate courts must review trial
court admission decisions under Daubert deferentially and that the logic by which
the expert traveled from principles and evidence to a conclusion also is subject
to appraisal by the court. Finally, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) held that
Daubert’s essential evidentiary reliability requirement applies to all fields of expert
evidence, not only to science. Daubert retained the general acceptance criterion,
though in downgraded status, and Kumho Tire demoted it further.
Although the standards set forth in the Daubert trilogy were ostensibly mere in-
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EXPERT EVIDENCE AFTER DAUBERT 109
in 2000 to reflect trial courts’ obligations to insure the soundness of expert evi-
dence as prescribed in these cases. Specifically, three rules governing opinion
testimony—Rules 701, 702, and 703—were amended. Rule 701, which permits
lay witness opinions under certain circumstances, was strengthened to ensure that
testimony that should be evaluated under Rule 702 did not slip in through the
back door of Rule 701. Rule 702 essentially codified Daubert by adding three new
numbered clauses. The rule now states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Rule 703 had often been used to import otherwise inadmissible hearsay state-
ments into evidence (Carlson 1992). The rule has now been amended to prevent
this. The new Rule 703 provides, in relevant part: “Facts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or
inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury
to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”
The federal courts have averaged about 500 decisions per year on Daubert-
related issues, and law journals have published thousands of articles at least touch-
ing on the subject. The states also are actively involved in this area, with more than
half the state courts now following the basic Daubert approach (though not all of
them the full trilogy) (Bernstein & Jackson 2004), and many other state courts are
deeply influenced by Daubert (Faigman et al. 2005). Some Frye states have on
occasion interpreted their test in ways that bear a strong resemblance to Daubert
principles (Florida and New York are the most notable).
The Meaning of Daubert
In essence, the Daubert trilogy adopts a changed perspective and relocates the axis
of decision. With the old commercial marketplace test, judges piggy-backed onto
what consumers seemed to think about a proffered expertise and expert. Under
Frye’s general acceptance test, judges took a rough nose count and deferred to
what the producers of knowledge thought about the knowledge they had to offer.
Daubert finally places the obligation to evaluate the evidence where one might have
expected it to be all along: on the judges themselves. For empirical or scientific
proffers, Daubert requires judges to evaluate the research findings and methods
supporting expert evidence and the principles used to extrapolate from that research
to the task at hand (Risinger 2000a). And for nonscience expertise (that is, expertise
on questions that are seldom the topic of systematic empirical investigation), courts
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evidence. [But see Sanders (2001), discussed below, who argues that the basic
principles of Daubert can be applied, if only by analogies still to be worked out,
to all expert knowledge.] This obligation on the part of judges is daunting. It may
be more apparent now than it was for centuries before why judges sought ways to
avoid such responsibility (and why, notwithstanding the commands of Daubert,
many of them still do).
Daubert, in many respects, appeared to be a revolutionary decision. Certainly
judges’, scholars’, and lawyers’ reactions to it support this view (see, e.g.,
Weisgram v. Marley 2000). The core principle of Daubert is its changed focus
from Frye’s deference to the experts to a more active judicial evaluation of a par-
ticular field’s claims of expertise. Under Frye, judges did not need to understand
research methodology because it was sufficient to inquire into the conclusions of
professionals in the pertinent fields. Daubert mandates that judges query which
methods support the scientific opinions that experts seek to offer as testimony, and
this requires that they understand those methods and data. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, for instance, questions about testing and error rate led to
responses about comparison groups, standard deviations, relative risk, statistical
significance, and many other concepts foreign to the average lawyer. The revolu-
tionary core of Daubert is in this call for judges to become knowledgeable about
basic research methods. Daubert, in effect, brought the scientific revolution into
the courtroom.
Revolutions inevitably produce partisans having widely varying views, includ-
ing some who defend the old regime, others who seek to justify the new order,
and still others on either side of the barricades, who determine its ultimate fate.
Many of the battles over the Daubert revolution have been carried out in the law
review literature, where the debate moved quickly from whether a revolution had
occurred at all to the nature of that revolution, and, even more so, to the philosoph-
ical justifications for it. For instance, some commentators argue that in Daubert,
“the U.S. Supreme Court took it upon itself to solve, once and for all, the knotty
problem of the demarcation of science from pseudoscience” (Goodstein 2000),
or that the Court adopted and imposed a specifically experimental or Newtonian
or Popperian view of science. But, in the legal context in which the Daubert tril-
ogy arose and to which it pertains, the Court can be seen as trying to solve more
flexibly a more modest (though similarly enduring and knotty) problem of trial
evidence, namely, how to filter proffered expert opinion testimony so that reliable
evidence is admitted and unreliable evidence is not. Daubert confronted a partic-
ular type of expertise, empirical claims, that lends itself to evaluation by scientific
methods. Daubert’s answer, in essence, is that if the proponent of such evidence
cannot supply good grounds for concluding that the expert opinion is sufficiently
trustworthy—cannot supply appropriate validation—then the testimony should be
excluded. It added that the obligation to test the soundness of expert proffers is
applicable to timeworn as well as to novel testimony. Given that Daubert itself was
a case about epidemiological (correlational) data, the charge that it wrongheadedly
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best filter has been chosen. In addition, one can debate the philosophical justifica-
tions for the revolution itself. How long this philosophical debate will endure only
time can reveal, but it certainly occupied a prominent place in the Daubert era’s
first decade.
JURISPRUDENCE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
In the course of writing Daubert, the Court, perhaps somewhat improvidently, cited
Sir Karl Popper and his notion of falsifiability as the defining criterion of a scien-
tific statement. As a consequence, the Court seemed to step into the quagmire of
the philosophy of science. Justice Blackmun’s citation to Popper has been roundly
criticized, beginning with the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The
chief justice complained that neither he nor, he supposed, most federal judges un-
derstood what falsifiability was. Moreover, the majority opinion, he complained,
appeared to call upon judges to be amateur scientists, a role for which they were
not trained and in which they were not likely to excel. Scholars also have chal-
lenged Blackmun’s conception of the philosophy of science, alternating between
pointing out that by 1993 Popper was no longer au courant among philosophers
and that, in any case, Popper’s philosophy was largely inapposite to the Court’s
ultimate holding. Not surprisingly, no citations to Popper are to be found in the
subsequent two legs of the Daubert trilogy. Despite the protestations and general
hand-wringing among courts and scholars, the Popperian perspective offers useful
insights into the regime enacted by Daubert and provides a basic justification for
the Court’s decision.
The Daubert Court’s Philosophy of Practicality
As is true in many legal contexts, especially when it comes to Supreme Court
opinion construction, Blackmun’s citation to Popper was meant to be more illus-
trative than necessary to understanding or applying the opinion. For Blackmun,
Popperianism was a synecdoche for the Court’s desire to distinguish proper sci-
entific inquiry from the perceived detritus of “junky science” (Edmond & Mercer
2002). Good science, according to the Court, follows certain methodological con-
ventions. Bad science does not. Accordingly, the Court suggested guideposts for
lower courts in their new obligations to admit good science and exclude the junk.
The vaunted Daubert four factors—(a) testing, (b) peer review and publication
(which Blackmun suggested mainly as a means of assisting judges in evaluating
research methodology), (c) error rate, and (d) general acceptance—are essentially
aspects of the ordinary conduct of scientific investigation.
The Daubert Court, therefore, was engaged in the rather pedestrian activity of
articulating a test by which lower courts could make decisions regarding the admis-
sibility of expert evidence. The decision must be understood in those terms. Unlike
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cases. But in articulating this evidentiary standard, Justice Blackmun effectively
entered the science wars (Haack 2003a). By citing Popper, rather than, say, Thomas
Kuhn (1996), the Court was signing on to scientific realism. Indeed, it is not ter-
ribly surprising that the Court, in seeking to establish standards for decisions in
concrete cases, would reject relativism in favor of a more positivistic and objective
form of realism.
Although commentators’ criticisms of the Court’s seeming philosophy are not
illegitimate, they are largely beside the point (Leiter 1997). Popper’s notion of
falsification was concerned with a fairly narrow philosophical issue involving
the problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience. Only peripherally was
Popper’s analysis relevant to demarcating admissible from inadmissible expertise
(O’Connor 1995). And this was precisely how the Court used Popper. Falsifiability
was shorthand for how scientists largely understand their jobs (Lewontin 1994),
and the Court was trying to incorporate scientific sensibilities into the legal culture
(Faigman 1999, Haack 2003b). The four factors the Court chose are immediately
recognizable as central to the scientific enterprise. Few scientists would disagree
that their task is to test hypotheses with a view to describing quantitatively the
world around them, whether it is the effects of Vioxx® or the causes and effects of
global warming. Moreover, virtually all scientists are concerned with the quality of
research design and methods, and they understand peer review and publication as a
standard component of the process of checking methodology before disseminating
research. Finally, general acceptance of one’s findings is the hoped-for end result
of the process. Thus, the Popper reference in Daubert can be seen to be more a
synecdoche for good science than a literal answer to some unasked question in the
philosophy of science.
Interestingly, when the Court eventually reached the legal question that was
more synonymous with the one for which Popper is so closely associated—
demarcating science and pseudoscience—the Court neither cited him nor at-
tempted to draw a bright line around which statements count as scientific. In Kumho
Tire, the Eleventh Circuit, as had several other circuits, concluded that Daubert’s
gatekeeping standard applied only to scientific testimony and did not pertain to
“technical or other specialized knowledge” that constitutes the other kinds of expert
testimony contemplated by Rule 702. The Supreme Court in Kumho Tire, how-
ever, held that Daubert applied to all expert testimony, not just the determinedly
scientific variety. Whereas Popper had good philosophical reasons for trying to
define those statements that qualify as scientific, the Court had good legal reasons
for eschewing that task (Jonakait 1997).
The basic challenge for trial courts in the area of expert testimony is to define
the boundary between admissible and inadmissible evidence. As the Kumho Tire
Court understood, the definition of adequate science is only a subpart of this
greater task. Expertise comes to court in myriad forms, ranging from the most
traditionally rigorous fields, such as physics, to the most traditionally lax, such
as clinical medicine. Some experts dress in the guise of science, such as forensic
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such as police officers. The one thing all these ostensible experts have in common
is their claim to opinions that are relevant and sufficiently accurate to be helpful
to the trier of fact.
Daubert’s holding, in fact, was limited to this helpfulness assessment. Daubert
described trial courts as gatekeepers whose responsibility is to preliminarily as-
sess whether proffered expert testimony is relevant and whether its basis is reliable.
Many courts and commentators, however, have confused this basic holding with
the factors that Justice Blackmun suggested might be useful to carrying out this
gatekeeping duty (see, e.g., Crump 2003). Consequently, these scholars have ac-
cused the Court of naively applying a positivistic model of science onto all expert
testimony. Reading Daubert as requiring the application of the very same criteria
to any and all expert evidence is plainly absurd. Auto mechanics, for example,
are not likely to publish their ideas in peer-reviewed journals or know what error
rates apply to the technology they rely upon. But the so-called four-factor test
of Daubert was never more than a set of suggested criteria by which to evaluate
ostensibly scientific evidence. As the Court has repeatedly said, including in the
Daubert opinion itself, no one set of criteria would be useful to assess the valid-
ity of every kind of science (from physics to biology), much less every kind of
expertise (from engineering to real estate appraisals).
The holding of Daubert, as made clear in Kumho Tire, applies to all expert
testimony. It provides, simply enough, that trial courts are obligated to determine
whether the basis for proffered expert testimony is, more likely than not, reliable
and valid. The four Daubert factors will often help courts make that determina-
tion, and sometimes they will not. In Kumho Tire, the Court declined any attempt
to set forth a single set of criteria that might be useful in assessing the myriad
kinds of expertise the courts hear. The point is that trial judges are obligated to
carry out the gatekeeping function; how they do so is a separate question. There-
fore, in the Daubert trilogy, the Court was engaged in the task of defining a rule
of procedure that would apply to all forms of expertise. Philosophers and soci-
ologists of science could offer insights into the difficulty of the task, but their
views have limited relevance to whether the Court chose the correct rule for its
purposes.
The Daubert trilogy, however, has left much that still needs to be done. The
four Daubert factors offer some guidance regarding a large proportion of experts,
particularly those from professional fields in which quantitative empirical methods
can be, and ordinarily are, employed. The Court in Kumho Tire, however, made
no attempt to offer similar sorts of criteria for evaluating experts for whom some
or all of the Daubert criteria might not be decisive or sufficient. Auto mechanics,
historians, accountants, clinical medical doctors, and scores of others have tra-
ditionally testified but would not be able to meet one or more Daubert criteria.
Clearly, the Court and the Rules of Evidence contemplate that many experts from
these fields would still be permitted to testify, but, at the same time, trial courts
must in some way determine if the bases for the opinions they intend to offer are
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Evaluating Expertise
Commentators have suggested various ways for courts to evaluate this wide vari-
ety of expert opinion. The first challenge is to establish expectations regarding the
testing that should have been done. In making the necessary validity assessment,
should courts consider whether an opinion could be rigorously tested, or should
they simply accept the standard practice of the particular field, which might in-
clude relying on experience as a basis of expertise? For example, perfume testers
might believe they gain expertise through long experience with different kinds of
perfumes, and it might not occur to them to carry out validity tests to measure this
belief. Clearly, such testing could be easily done, but just as clearly professional
perfume testers generally do not do so. Should a court demand that these tests be
done, or that a particular perfume tester undergo proficiency testing before his or
her opinion will be admitted into evidence (Faigman 2002)?
In addition to the level of rigor to be expected, courts must determine how (or
pursuant to what criteria) they should evaluate the numerous expertises that rely
on a wide variety of methods, from casual experience to controlled experiment
(Seton Hall Symposium 2003). Scholars have begun to address this issue, with
several setting forth taxonomies that might be employed for different categories
of expertise (Gross & Mnookin 2003, Risinger 2005). Sanders (2001) argues for
a different approach. He suggests that “[t]he judicial task will be made more
manageable if in both scientific and nonscientific testimony, the courts assess the
expert’s reasoning from an objective, rational processing perspective with a single
test” (p. 409). In favoring this rational form of information processing, Sanders
rejects as undependable the basic alternative foundation of most expert opinion:
experientially based information processing. As a practical matter, he states that
this approach means that courts “should focus on the first Daubert criterion”
(Sanders 2001, p. 409). The testing criterion, he explains, has at its core a concern
with methodology. It asks the expert to describe objectively how the hypothesis
at issue can be tested and how the expert put the hypothesis to the test (Sanders
2001, p. 409).
Social Construction and Gatekeeping
Implicit in much of the debate about the nature of scientific knowledge is an-
other controversial matter that concerns whether judges as gatekeepers usurp the
role of jurors in the trial process. Scholars who reject the scientific realism of
Daubert, preferring a more Kuhnian-based relativism, have also bemoaned what
they believe to be Daubert’s conferral of excessive power on judges. For instance,
sociologists of science who believe that scientific knowledge is largely socially
constructed have generally doubted the wisdom of the gatekeeper function at the
core of Daubert. However, the tenets associated with a social constructionist view
of science are not necessarily inconsistent with the gatekeeping role defined in
Daubert. Consider, for example, the views of Jasanoff (1992), a particularly in-
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restrictive rule of admissibility, such as that of Daubert. According to Jasanoff
(1992, p. 347),
[t]he most significant insight that has emerged from sociological studies of sci-
ence in the past 15 years or so is the view that science is socially constructed. . . .
[T]he “facts” that scientists present to the rest of the world are not simply reflec-
tions of nature; rather, these “facts” are produced by human agency, through
the institutions and processes of science, and hence they invariably contain a
social component.
This insight leads ineluctably to the conclusion that judges should exercise their
power to exclude expert evidence with restraint. When judges exclude experts,
[t]hey help shape an image of reality that is colored in part by their own
preferences and prejudices about how the world should work. Such power need
not always be held in check, but it should be exercised sparingly. Otherwise,
one risks substituting the expert authority of the black robe and the bench for
that of the white lab coat—an outcome that poorly serves the causes of justice
or of science (Jasanoff 1992, p. 359).
The view that science might be socially constructed is not foreign to courts’
understanding, and, indeed, the Daubert Court cited Jasanoff when it cautioned
that peer review and publication are not the sine qua non of good science. At the
same time that the Court’s reliance on Popper and Hempel reflected its scientific
realism, its acknowledgment of a role for social construction reflected courts’ tra-
ditional, cautious approach to experts and advocates. Nor is social construction
foreign to the understanding of scientists. The very purpose of scientific method
is to try to minimize the contribution of bias (borne of social or personal construc-
tion) and maximize the contribution of evidence of the phenomenon under study.
This reflects what is probably the dominant view among thoughtful scientists,
scholars, and courts: a realist-constructionist view of science (social construction
constrained by the empirical world) (Cole 1992, Haack 2003a, Sanders et al. 2002).
But assessing whether research methodology is successful, and therefore
whether scientific knowledge, or empirical knowledge more generally, is socially
constructed, does not answer the question of what standard of admissibility should
apply to expert testimony. Indeed, from a legal-structural perspective, Daubert’s
gatekeeping standard is entirely consistent with at least the nonradical version
of the social construction of science. Jasanoff, for example, cites the fear that the
“preferences and prejudices” of the “black robe and bench” will replace “the white
lab coat.” But the more that science is socially constructed, the less the black robe
should defer to the white lab coat. Judges have the institutional and, in most re-
spects, the constitutional obligation to ensure due process and fair and balanced
trial procedures. To the extent that expert testimony is infused with “preferences
and prejudices,” they should be those of the judge and not the expert. The re-
sponsibility to exercise such preferences and sometimes impose such prejudices
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invest this authority first in experts who are not accountable in the way that judges
are and, second, in juries to judge whether the evidence given them is worth any
consideration. Experts are fact witnesses, and their value to the trial process lies
exclusively in their capacity to assist jurors to adjudicate disputed facts. Judges
are charged with the discretion to interpret the law and apply the values inherent in
these interpretations to particular disputes. If anyone’s preferences and prejudices
are going to infuse the trial process, it should be those of the judges, whose biases
(such as they are) are imposed with political legitimacy. And, if we hope to limit
the effect of bad, biased, or seriously misleading testimony, judicial gatekeeping
is our best hope.
Law uses expertise (whether scientifically, technically, or experientially based)
as a tool for its own purposes. A philosophy of science answers only a small portion
of the questions involved in developing a philosophy of expert evidence. Whereas
science strives for truth, truth is only one component of the law’s mission.
Expertise and Procedural Considerations
Ordinarily, rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence are firmly within the
trial court’s discretion. The principal reason for this is that trial courts are in a better
position than appellate courts to screen evidence, an essential part of conducting
a trial. In Joiner and Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court followed the conventional
wisdom and held that appellate courts owe substantial deference to the trial court,
both in the criteria used to assess the validity of proffered expertise (Kumho Tire)
and the ultimate admissibility decision (Joiner). Under the Daubert trilogy, rulings
on expert evidence, like other evidentiary rulings, can be overturned on appeal only
for an abuse of discretion. This approach makes jurisprudential sense if expert
evidence is like other kinds of evidence, but it is not.
Some questions are case specific, whereas others are relevant across a broad
spectrum of cases. For example, whether or not a car in a particular case went
though a red light has no implications for what color a traffic light was in other
cases. But if “Which color grants a driver the right of way?” has a different answer
from case to case, that would be arbitrary and lawless. Questions of fact, which
typically affect only the case before the court and do not have meaning for other
future cases, can be altered on appeal only when clear error is found. In contrast,
matters of law, which apply across cases, are reviewed de novo. This differential
treatment grants deference on some kinds of questions and consistency on other
kinds, and facilitates judicial efficiency along with the rule of law: Once green is
declared by a legislature or appellate court to indicate go, that question is decided
for all trial courts in the jurisdiction.
Similarly, in most evidentiary contexts, admissibility decisions are case specific.
Scientific evidence, however, does not conform to this traditional wisdom. Many
scientific findings transcend individual cases. Questions such as whether Bendectin
is a teratogen, smoking causes lung cancer, or polygraphs detect lying do not, in
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of knowledge to issues in a particular case or whether a given expert has correctly
applied a technique in a given instance are case specific.)
Monahan and Walker, writing before the Daubert decisions, were the first to
explore the implications of this insight (Monahan & Walker 1986; Walker &
Monahan 1987, 1988). Monahan and Walker argue that although facts and law
differ in that one is positive and the other normative, facts sometimes share an
important similarity with law: Some factual issues are case specific and some
transcend individual cases. The Monahan-Walker analysis has procedural impli-
cations. Facts that are trans-case in nature should be treated much as law is treated:
Subject to de novo review on appeal, courts are not obligated to rely on the record
developed by the parties but can engage in their own inquiries, and the holdings
of higher courts should be binding on lower courts.
To allow issues such as whether smoking increases the risk of lung cancer
to be decided one way in one case in one trial court and differently in another
case in another trial court in the same jurisdiction would strike most observers as
plainly irrational. Moreover, to require appellate courts to declare that contradic-
tory answers to such questions by lower courts are, in the absence of clear error,
both right, as the holding in Joiner requires, merely highlights the problem. Were
courts to make such rulings, scientists, editorial writers, and the general public
would wonder out loud about how courts can possibly believe that two contradic-
tory propositions about unchanging general phenomena can both be regarded by
the law as true. When the problem presents itself starkly, courts certainly see the
implications. Thus, for example, when confronted by two different district courts
reaching opposite conclusions about whether billboard advertising of alcohol in-
creases auto accidents (and would therefore be subject to regulation), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that it had no choice but to examine
the underlying empirical question for itself and reach one decision for both cases
below (Dunagin v. City of Oxford 1983).
Of course, the scientific questions and their answers are not always, or ever,
straightforward. The procedural suggestions of Monahan and Walker work best
when the answers are reasonably well studied and accessible to the courts, which
may require allowing the science and judicial experience with the matter to ripen
before an appellate court rules as a matter of law. Even then, an appellate court
might get the science wrong, so that courts at all levels need to be ready to re-
visit issues they thought had been resolved (whenever a party makes a sufficient
showing)—just as they do when an error of law has been made. Moreover, we might
expect scientific conclusions to be more subject to change than are normative con-
clusions because the former are more vulnerable to the growth of knowledge and
convincing demonstrations of past errors than normative conclusions generally
are.
The preceding discussion about the law-likeness of some scientific questions
applies to decisions whether or not to admit expert evidence. A certain kind of
medical knowledge, applied to a certain class of problems, cannot be valid in some
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evidence or the identification of handprinting or fragmentary fingerprints cannot
be invalid in some places and valid in others.
THE IMPACT OF DAUBERT
What difference does Daubert actually make? The answer is multifaceted. Al-
though changes in the gatekeeping behavior of judges might be the kinds of ef-
fects that first come to mind, one ought not to overlook changes in the behavior of
lawyers, litigants, and expert witnesses—either in anticipation of or in reaction to
changes in judicial treatment of expert evidence—or the discussions that scholars
and those in the legal system generally have about expert evidence.
Anticipation of Increased Scrutiny
The most unmistakable impact of Daubert has been the changes in federal evidence
law, changes that have been radiating into state law. Another unmistakable impact
has been the production of many hundreds of scholarly articles on the admissibility
of expert testimony, most of them clearly undertaken in the wake of Daubert,
concerning the meaning and role of the Daubert trilogy and their application by
lower courts. The federal courts alone have recently averaged about 500 decisions
per year on Daubert-related issues. Many of those decisions involved Daubert
hearings at which scrutiny was given to proffers of expert evidence, many of
which, before Daubert, entered court with little if any scrutiny. If nothing more,
one can certainly say that the law has changed and that people have been talking
about those changes.
Some courts and commentators assumed that Daubert, like Frye, applied only
to novel scientific evidence. Those who thought so were wrong. The Daubert
opinion explicitly mentions (though only in a footnote) that the Court did “not read
the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional
evidence.” It continues that “well-established propositions are less likely to be
challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended.” This
plainly suggests that long veneration was no protection from scrutiny. And, as the
Court later taught in Kumho Tire, Daubert was not even limited to science.
Many courts and commentators were unsure or disagreed about whether Daubert,
in contrast to Frye, raised or lowered the threshold of admission. Gatowski and
colleagues’ (2001) survey of judges found that 32% believed the intent was to
raise the threshold of admissibility for scientific evidence, 23% believed the intent
was to lower the threshold, and 36% believed the intent was neither to raise nor to
lower but instead to articulate a framework for admissibility. Numerous courts have
expressed surprise to discover that their application of a supposedly more liberal
test led them to the brink of excluding evidence that had never before appeared so
excludable. The better answer probably is that “it depends.”
Permit us to oversimplify here to illustrate an essential point. The Frye and
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TABLE 1 Outcomes of scrutiny of expert evidence under the Frye and Daubert tests
Frye: General
acceptance in scientific Daubert: Valid scientific foundation
community Strong Weak





generally accepted the proposition is in a reference community or communities.
Daubert, in contrast, inquires directly into the proposition’s scientific foundations.
As Table 1 illustrates, these two questions should usually lead to the same answer
about admissibility. That which has a strong scientific foundation usually will be
generally accepted; that which has a weak scientific foundation usually will not
be widely accepted. In either situation, both tests should lead to the same decision
to admit or to exclude.
But there are circumstances in which the underlying attributes of the expert
evidence diverge. When a scientific proposition is sound but not generally accepted,
Daubert should admit while Frye should exclude. This is the category of cases that
most commentators and courts had in mind when they suggested that Daubert is
more liberal than Frye. But when a scientific proposition has not been shown to
be sound yet nevertheless has gained general acceptance in its field, then Daubert
excludes even though Frye admits. This latter category is not a null set; it contains,
perhaps most notably, many of the forensic sciences.
The anticipated impact of Daubert’s filtering of expert evidence prompted con-
cern, litigation, and even empirical research in fields that had done little previous
testing of their theories. For a time, some fields tried to evade scrutiny by re-
defining themselves as nonscience or by emphasizing their art over their science.
Pursuing this strategy, a consortium of law enforcement organizations—fearing
that the assertedly expert testimony of forensic scientists and police officers would
be excluded if they were to be required to prove that what they were saying had
a sound basis—submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire.
The brief urged the Court to exempt from Daubert scrutiny prosecution expert
evidence, “the great bulk of [which] does not involve scientific theories, method-
ologies, techniques, or data in any respect. . .” but instead offers opinions “about
such things as accident reconstruction, fingerprint, footprint and handprint [iden-
tification], handwriting analysis, firearms markings and toolmarks and the unique
characteristics of guns, bullets, and shell casings, and bloodstain pattern identifi-
cation” (Am. Eff. Law Enforc. et al. 1997). Nevertheless, the decision in Kumho
Tire extended Daubert scrutiny to all fields of asserted expertise.
Daubert and Kumho Tire prompted expectations that if fields such as the forensic
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need to undertake the necessary research. Such thinking led the National Institute
of Justice to launch several funding initiatives, inviting researchers to begin to fill
the considerable gaps in the knowledge claims of these fields that they were sure
the courts would now discover in the glare of Daubert and Kumho Tire scrutiny
(e.g., Natl. Inst. Justice 2000).
Similarly, civil litigants, especially tort plaintiffs, anticipated that Daubert
would raise barriers to their proffered expert evidence—although less dramati-
cally than the prosecution sciences because most civil plaintiff experts come from
fields such as medicine and engineering, where research and education are bet-
ter established and more systematic. Plaintiffs’ attorneys were advised to choose
their experts more carefully and prepare their experts (and themselves) more thor-
oughly to meet Daubert scrutiny; some were advised to avoid filing their cases in
the federal courts to avoid Daubert scrutiny entirely (Assoc. Trial Lawyers Am.
2004).
One can find articles by practitioners and scholars in various fields reflecting
anxieties about the prospect of having their offerings challenged and tested un-
der Daubert. Some scholars and researchers point out that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daubert has had the salutary effect of precipitating improvements in
their own fields (e.g., Shuman & Sales 1999). Yet others argue that some fields
are unlikely to make any improvements if not impelled to do so by the threat of
exclusion or limitation (e.g., Faigman et al. 2005, chapter 1).
Admissibility on the Books versus Admissibility in Action
That the law in action can sometimes be quite different from the law on the books
is something legal realists noted decades ago. The implementation of the Daubert
trilogy can be viewed as an immense case study of this phenomenon. But the
picture is not a simple one.
Several studies have examined the patterns of admissibility decisions in cases
decided prior to and after the adoption of Daubert, casting at least some light on
the behavior of both federal and state courts in several categories of cases. The
patterns of change and nonchange provoke one to think about the nature of courts
and the society in which they are embedded.
Comparisons of the rate of pretrial challenges to the admissibility of expert
evidence before and following Daubert found, overall, a marked increase [Risinger
(2000b), both civil and criminal case samples in both federal and state courts; Dixon
& Gill (2001), federal civil cases; Krafka et al. (2002), federal civil cases]. But,
in the civil arena, Risinger (2000b) found that nearly 90% of the challenges were
raised by defendants against plaintiffs’ expert evidence. Among the criminal cases,
where the overwhelming bulk of expert evidence is offered by the government,
defendants are far less active in bringing challenges, often failing to raise objections
that would have been reasonable and available, and which presumably would have
been raised in a civil case involving evidence with similarly weak foundations. In
federal courts, fewer than 10% of the challenges to expert evidence were in criminal
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vice versa by a ratio of 7:2, even though the government presents the far larger
target for attack.
When a challenge is mounted, how do the courts respond? In civil cases, post-
Daubert courts are more likely to exclude challenged expert evidence than they
had been before. Dixon & Gill (2001) found that challenged expert evidence was
excluded about 50% of the time pre-Daubert; that figure rose to as much as 70%
in years post-Daubert. In surveys conducted by Krafka et al. (2002) before and
after Daubert, federal judges reported excluding or limiting challenged expert
evidence 25% of the time pre-Daubert, compared with 41% of the time post-
Daubert. But the data on excluded evidence reveal a notable lack of symmetry
between the success of plaintiffs compared with defendants. Risinger (2000b)
found that defendants succeeded about two thirds of the time in the many fed-
eral cases in which they challenged plaintiff experts. In the smaller set of cases
in which plaintiffs challenged defense-proffered expertise, the challenges suc-
ceeded less than half the time. This pattern was repeated on appeal. In state
civil cases, Risinger found that challenges by plaintiffs and by defendants suc-
ceeded at about the same 40% rate, but of course defendants were more active
in bringing challenges (82% of the challenges on appeal were by defendants). A
reading of the cases confirms that courts have become more aggressive in their
scrutiny and exclusion of evidence in civil cases. The reader can get a good taste
of this from reading the “Notes of Decisions” accompanying chapters on eco-
nomics, engineering, survey research, epidemiology, toxicology, and medicine
in the Annotated Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Second (Saks et al.
2004).
On the criminal side, the picture is quite different. Risinger found that, post-
Daubert, in federal district courts defense challenges to government evidence
succeeded less than 10% of the time. Government challenges to defense evidence
succeeded two thirds of the time. On appeal, defense-proffered expertise was found
to have been properly excluded 83% of the time. Prosecution-proffered expertise
that had been admitted at trial was excluded only once on appeal. Defendants did
somewhat better in state courts than in federal courts, winning a quarter of their
challenges. Prosecution challenges to defense expertise succeeded about three
quarters of the time.
Groscup and colleagues’ (2002) data (criminal cases drawn from federal appel-
late courts) suggest that patterns of admission and exclusion are unchanged from
before Daubert, and that this constancy has held true for each category of expert
testimony examined. Much of the difference between the conclusions of this study
and that of the others can be attributed to the universe of cases on which this study
focused. That is, the findings reflect the behavior of the courts in the body of cases
examined. As Groscup et al. realized, by focusing on appellate cases they are miss-
ing most of the action (or inaction) at the trial court level. The only trial rulings
their selection method captures are those that resulted in appeal, meaning cases
in which defendants lost Daubert challenges and then also lost their trials. How-
ever, Groscup et al.’s method allows us to see more precisely how the decisions
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“Of course, none of this,” as Risinger notes, “goes directly to the validity of any
given decision,” but the data “are fairly striking in their own right” (Risinger 2000b,
p. 108). One possible explanation for the differences between civil and criminal
cases is that there are meaningful differences in the quality of the science being
offered in the different groups of cases and that there are systematic differences
between the factual issues that arise in civil and criminal cases. Or, perhaps, the
differential outcomes are attributable to differences in the quality of advocacy
(borne of differences in resources) in the two realms. However, some commentators
suggest that social and political differences easily explain the differential treatment:
As a general proposition, judges disfavor civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants
and are more likely to rule against them than against their opposites even when
presenting equivalent evidence or arguments. A more definitive explanation of the
pattern awaits future research.
Meanwhile, one can ponder some tantalizing hints. Risinger’s analyses of de-
cisions by type of expert evidence proffered in criminal cases, as well as other
reviews of government science in criminal cases (e.g., Faigman et al. 2005, foren-
sic science chapters), suggest that if Daubert gatekeeping were rationally based
on the quality of the underlying expert evidence, the exclusion rate pursuant to
defense challenges would be higher than it is. The irony is more pronounced in
light of data examining the trial evidence in DNA exoneration cases, which find
that faulty forensic science is second only to eyewitness errors as the leading cause
of erroneous convictions (Saks & Koehler 2005).
What Are Judges Doing When Undertaking Daubert Review?
Can we explain the contrast between the success of challenges by civil defen-
dants and lack of success by criminal defendants? Recalling the discussion that
accompanied Table 1, for well-developed disciplines the same results should occur
whether the filter applied is Frye or Daubert. No change should occur for most
of the evidence proffered in civil cases if Frye-like criteria were being employed
pre-Daubert. Apparently, such criteria were not being employed. Notwithstanding
that rules of evidence apply equally to civil and criminal cases (with few excep-
tions), courts often acted as though Frye applied only to criminal cases, whereas
many judges understood Daubert to apply especially to civil cases. So Daubert
had much to offer to civil cases, even if logically it should not have. But the cell in
Table 1 that would have called for the most dramatic changes in admissibility pre-
to post-Daubert is the low-validity/high-general-acceptance cell, which is largely
populated with weak forensic individualization science. For fields in this category,
the move from Frye to Daubert would (logically) have produced a noticeable (if
not dramatic) shift from admission to exclusion. But, as both counts and readings
of the cases suggest, it has not. Can this be explained?
A number of studies suggest that judges do not employ Daubert as the directive
it seems by its terms to be—a directive to conduct meaningful and sincere analyses
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them to their logical destination. Instead, judges have taken Daubert to be a vague
call to arms against junk science in civil cases while keeping hands off of the
government’s proffers in criminal cases.
Several studies have looked beneath the surface of mere counts of decisions to
admit or exclude to find the basis of the courts’ less-than-straightforward treatment
of admissibility issues in the post-Daubert era. Krafka et al.’s (2002) surveys found
that in deciding expert admissibility in civil cases, federal judges were far more
likely to rest their appraisal of the evidence on considerations that were not new
with Daubert (e.g., relevance, qualifications, ability to assist trier of fact) than they
were to employ the new Daubert factors (testing, quality of underlying research,
error rates). Thus, in the wake of Daubert, judges were excluding more expert
evidence, but doing so using legal doctrines that were available before Daubert.
The new guidance developed in Daubert played little role in these courts’ analyses
of the expert evidence they were now excluding.
Similar conclusions emerged from a very different research approach: Groscup
et al. (2002) analyzed the amount of time (word counts, actually) a large sample
of federal criminal appellate opinions devoted to discussing the factors they were
employing to evaluate the proffered expert evidence in the case. After Daubert,
appellate opinions concerning the admissibility of expert evidence spent less time
discussing general acceptance and more time discussing Rule 702 and the proce-
dures under which pretrial challenges are conducted, but they did not increase the
amount of attention paid to the specific factors suggested by Daubert for evalu-
ating scientific evidence. “There was no comparable increase in the discussion of
the four Daubert criteria in evaluating expert testimony. Discussion of Daubert
was lengthy, but the discussion devoted to the three new criteria was relatively
abbreviated” (Groscup et al. 2002, p. 365).
The limited attention actually paid in judicial opinions to the vaunted (or reviled)
Daubert factors is less surprising once one realizes that judges do not understand
what they mean. Gatowski et al. (2001) surveyed and interviewed a large sample
of state court judges. Nearly all the respondents strongly supported the gatekeeper
role and nearly two thirds asserted that they were in fact active in making expert
evidence admissibility decisions, and asserted high regard for Daubert’s provision
of “the basis. . . for justifying or explaining the decision-making process” and for
the usefulness of the specific Daubert guidelines. But when asked to define or ex-
plain each of the Daubert factors, and probed further when they had difficulty, only
5% of the respondents demonstrated a working understanding of falsifiability, and
only 4% demonstrated an understanding of error rate. And, when presented with
specific examples of expert testimony to evaluate, the criterion relied upon most
heavily was general acceptance. The authors summed up their findings by sug-
gesting that the judges’ “responses reflected more of the rhetoric of Daubert than
the substance.” Other research suggests that judges have difficulty distinguishing
good research designs from poor ones (Kovera & McAuliff 2000).
More traditional legal analysis—that is, close reading of cases—generally sup-
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expert evidence, judicial opinions displaying sophisticated application of Daubert
or other thoughtful focus on the validity of the proffered expertise are few and far
between. The major exceptions to this generalization seem to be toxic tort litiga-
tion, where judicial sophistication is more evident, and cases involving economic
analysis of damages (compare relevant chapters in Faigman et al. 2005). These
exceptions suggest that the evolution of judicial sophistication is associated with
increasing sophistication of counsel and with growing experience with debate on
a subject.
As an example of judicial casualness about validity, the forensic science area
is particularly telling. Logically, many of these fields are highly vulnerable under
Daubert (Thornton & Peterson 2005). But those fields have endured little other
than anxiety. Three examples suffice [but for one notable exception, see U.S. v.
Crisp (2003), dissenting opinion].
First, a review of cases found that although not a single court could cite any sys-
tematic empirical evidence supporting critical propositions underlying fingerprint
identification, the courts all nevertheless found the proffered testimony regarding
fingerprint evidence not only admissible but often worthy of high praise [“the very
archetype of reliable expert testimony under [Daubert],” (U.S. v. Havvard 2000,
p. 855)]. That review summed up the body of cases it examined as little more than
“a catalog of evasions” of the duty to scrutinize under Daubert (Faigman et al.
2005, chapter 27, p. 432). An explanation might be that the field of fingerprint iden-
tification has been so effective in its public mythology that courts cannot suspend
their belief long enough to examine the real basis of the claims (Cole 2001).
Second, not long after the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted Daubert as that
state’s standard for testing expert evidence, the same court had occasion to evaluate
the admissibility of microscopic hair comparison evidence (Johnson v. Common-
wealth 1999). Although the court could not cite any studies at all, it nevertheless
held the evidence to be fully admissible based on its assumption of general accep-
tance by past Kentucky cases—even though no prior Kentucky cases had found the
evidence to be generally accepted or had even addressed the issue. The Johnson
court reasoned that silence bespoke general acceptance (Saks 2004).
Third, in the very case by which the Alaska Supreme Court adopted Daubert as
its admission doctrine (State v. Coon 1999), and even though the court remanded
to the trial court for the taking of further evidence in anticipation of adopting and
applying Daubert, no court involved in the case built its holding on a foundation
of relevant studies or other data. Voiceprint identification expert evidence was
admitted as unthinkingly as ever, even in Alaska’s inaugural Daubert decision,
and even though for this forensic identification science a good bit of relevant data
does exist (Faigman et al. 2005).
In sum, Daubert has had somewhat paradoxical effects. Judges overwhelmingly
say they subscribe to the gatekeeper role and endorse Daubert’s framework for
analyzing scientific (and other) expert evidence. It has precipitated a great increase
in judicial examination of expert evidence. Yet judges often appear to have little
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invest little of their scrutiny and decision making in seriously applying Daubert
or in bringing any other kind of thoughtful examination to bear. Nevertheless,
the decisions reveal a pattern of impact: Daubert has led to increased exclusion
of expert evidence, mostly in civil cases, and most of that excluding plaintiffs’
evidence. The questionable sciences of criminal cases, often among the weakest
of the scientific evidence that comes to court, are by one device or another usually
admitted (or perhaps it is more accurate to say they are granted exemption from
serious scrutiny).
Daubert has precipitated a pattern of gatekeeping that is impossible to explain
in terms of Daubert’s doctrinal elements or the relative quality of the underlying
science presented for scrutiny. Thus, Daubert’s impact may have more to do with
the sociology of judging than with the law of Daubert (Kaye et al. 2004). The future
of expert evidence will need to take into account these odd patterns of decision
making.
THE FUTURE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
One can contemplate the future of expert evidence either predictively or prescrip-
tively. The former, of course, is the more challenging and risky.
Predictions
Dramatic national change in the law of expert evidence is unlikely to occur again
soon. The Supreme Court rarely changes its mind shortly after making a grand
pronouncement. But once the Court becomes aware of problems in the implemen-
tation of its earlier rulings, it might adjust the law in ways it thinks will solve
those problems. This is especially so if the lower courts split in regard to how they
handle certain kinds of evidence. The most likely candidate for high court inter-
vention is clinical medicine, a subject currently dealt with differently in different
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions, for example, allow expert medical opinion with
little supporting research (see, e.g., Heller v. Shaw 1999), whereas others exclude
such opinion pending the completion of sufficient research to support the proffered
opinion (see, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc. 1999).
The more profound problem in the implementation of Daubert, as discussed
in the previous section, is the lower courts’ apparent inconsistency in applying
Daubert in civil and criminal cases. If the causes are in any sense sociological or
political, and the Court shares in the cultural assumptions and biases that led to
that pattern of differential treatment, then the Court may have little desire to alter
them.
Although Daubert had potential to press various fields toward improvements,
including the first serious research they have done on their claims, little of the
potential has been realized, and it seems to be declining. Indeed, one scholar
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Daubert, the chances of improvement in those fields, like the chance of judicial
re-examination, are less than ever (Berger 2003).
The deferential standard of review announced in General Electric v. Joiner can-
not survive in the long run. Courts will find ways to fudge, to slow the contradictory
or repetitious examinations of the same evidence again and again. Eventually, the
Supreme Court can be expected to authorize less deferential review, at least in
some classes of cases.
The frequent calls for the increased use of court-appointed witnesses (e.g.,
Breyer 2000) will go largely unheeded. Although the net use of court-appointed
experts and, possibly more so, technical advisers is likely to rise over time, this
reform is unlikely to be as transforming as its advocates hope. The power to
appoint experts has long been available to the courts, was codified in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and, despite periodic calls for making more use of the power,
remains largely unused (Cecil & Willging 1993). This pattern is a testament to the
courts’ commitment to the adversarial process or to their disinclination to become
more managerial. Gross (1991) has offered an impressive analysis of the failure,
and continuing failure, of calls for more use of court-appointed experts. And he
suggests an alternative for accomplishing much of the good of court appointment
while preserving the adversarial imperative: Invite the parties to nominate a certain
number of experts to be court-appointed, appoint everyone the parties nominated
(who would then understand that their first loyalty is to the court), and then require
that all meetings with these experts be open to all parties (and forbid any contact
outside of those open meetings). To our knowledge, Gross’s suggestions have not
yet been followed by any court.
As the fraction of the population of lawyers and judges consisting of people with
scientific training slowly grows—due as much as anything else to the advent of
more technologies (requiring lawyers to protect or challenge intellectual property
claims) or downturns in the market for scientists and engineers—there will be more
lawyers and judges who are capable of understanding what Daubert is aiming to
do and able to see where it has been failing most.
Kumho Tire has potentially deep and demanding implications, as illustrated
by the taxonomies of expert evidence that several scholars have started the law
thinking about. We suspect that, given the difficulties courts have had in using the
essentially ready-made criteria of empirical science handed to them by Daubert,
the development of nonscience criteria for nonscience fields will be a much steeper
and thornier path for the courts to travel.
Prescriptions
In one particular type of case, courts could and might and, we think, should make
increased use of experts appointed to serve by (and for the educational benefit
of) the court and not by the parties: In consolidated class actions, such as mass
toxic torts, the dispute over certain empirical claims is to be resolved in one grand
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courts might feel an unusual obligation to reach the best possible answer. On such
occasions they can appoint advisory juries (or similar panels composed of experts)
to consider the evidence and offer the court suggested findings. Expert panels have
been appointed, for example, in the silicone breast implant litigation (In re SGBI
Litigation 1997) and the Parlodel litigation (Soldo v. Sandoz 2003). The use of
such panels should be expanded.
Although there have been efforts to teach judges to become better students
of natural and social science as well as statistics, crash courses and checklists
will probably not accomplish much. To ensure that courts have judges with sci-
entific acumen, the best method is to recruit scientifically educated lawyers to
the legal profession and then to the bench. We note above that more such per-
sons are becoming lawyers. Perhaps the process could be accelerated. Perhaps the
judiciary—which employs a great many students of the humanities—already has
all the personnel it needs to assess the offerings of nonscience expertises.
Judicial gatekeeping has unavoidable effects on the creation of new knowledge.
We believe the courts should act in ways that promote the growth of knowledge that
is important to resolving major or frequent disputes that come before the courts.
For example, some fields will do no more research than is required of them. If
the courts set a low threshold of admission, some fields will develop little or no
fundamental new knowledge. They can remain in business with what they already
have and, indeed, risk setting themselves back in the eyes of courts by producing
real data that can never show them to be as flawless as they have long claimed
themselves to be. For these fields, most often seen on the criminal side of the docket,
the courts should set higher thresholds, or set time limits (a period of years) for the
production of research on fundamental questions about the field. If nothing else,
courts should require parties to remain within the bounds of the knowledge they
have, forbidding wishful exaggerations, and requiring statements of the limits of
what is known, whether those statements are informed by data showing error rates
or by the absence of data on error rates. A court could ask parties for briefs on
these matters and issue its own instruction to the jury on the limits of expertise.
On the civil side, a similar problem of ignorance-is-bliss exists, but it requires
a different solution. A manufacturer, such as a pharmaceutical company, has no
inherent incentive to test a product for safety or effectiveness. That is why reg-
ulations sometimes exist to compel such testing. Once the product is approved
and is in the market, then the less the company learns about it the better. When
plaintiffs begin to suspect harmfulness, under Daubert their claims will often die
with the pretrial Daubert hearing because the limited evidence will mean that their
experts cannot even testify at trial. (In the past, such suits would sometimes get
to juries and, under that scenario, manufacturers had an incentive to conduct ad-
ditional research in the hope of acquiring evidence with which to defend against
the claim.) Thus, Daubert ironically acts as a disincentive to improve the body of
scientific knowledge about products. To ameliorate this problem, one procedural
device might be considered: When one party has a substantially greater ability
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placed on that party. In its absence, the other side’s experts could be allowed to
testify to the limited knowledge that does exist, across some lowered threshold of
admission.
Finally, we urge that the serious study of expert evidence by social scientists
continue and expand. To understand the interaction of experts and the courts, more
research is needed.
The Annual Review of Law and Social Science is online at
http://lawsocsci.annualreviews.org
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